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NOTES
the statement of the court in QUInn v. Phipps7 that equity will raise a constructive trust
where one, through fraud, abuse of confidence, or through some questionable means,
gains an advantage for himself which in equity and good conscience he should not be
permitted to retain. Professor Bogert calls the cataloguing of the types of conduct
which will give rise to a constructive trust the main problem in that field and says
that not all constructive trusts can be based on "fraud" unless the word is taken to
include any conduct which equity would treat as "unfair, unconscionable, and unjust."
'8
Even the most liberal delineation of conduct which will give rise to a constructive
trust presupposes some type of unfair or inequitable advantage taken or held by the
defendant. So for the appellee in the Woodruff case to prevail he must show that the
appellant received something which in good conscience was the property of the
appellee. The appellees contention that his bill was represented as a valid obligation
of appellant does not fit within any of the foregoing definitions of the required types
of conduct. There was no fraud, at least as against appellee, in using his bill to nego-
tiate a settlement. The appellee did not plead that he had a right to obtain payment
directly from the transit company and that the money was wrongfully. obtained by
appellant. Nor did he plead any agreement that the amount of his bill would be held
in trust if recovered in a settlement. 9 Appellee's right against appellant was not con-
tingent upon arriving at a settlement and the mere hope or expectation of receiving
payment out of a particular fund will not create a trust.'0 The fact that appellant
obtained and retained all the settlement is therefore not an equitable wrong to appellee.
He has shown only a creditor-debtor relationship, which the appellant does not deny,
except as to amount. There has long been a distinction in equity between a trust and
a debt,1' and the United States Supreme Court, in a case where the Court's sympathy
lay with the petitioner for equitable relief, held that the mere non-payment of a debt is
not a circumstance that will give rise to a constructive trust.
12
Therefore, if the appellee can establish the reasonableness of his charge, he can
recover the full amount in an action at law, and if it cannot so be established there is
no reason for equity to aid him in an exorbitant recovery, and the Court of Appeals
correctly denied him relief.
James M. Sanderson.
WITNESSES: PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION-CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
AFTER PREVIOUS WAIVER.-In the recent case of In re Neff' a United States Court of
Appeals held that a witness' waiver of her privilege against self incrimination by
testifying before a grand jury is not a waiver of that privilege for purposes of the
subsequent trial.
A witness, in response to a subpoena, had appeared before the federal grand jury
for the District of New Jersey. There, she had answered questions put to her in con-
nection with her acquaintance with one Valenti, then under investigation for falsely
"93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927).
83 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471.
"RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 12, Comment j (1935).'
101 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 19.
"I SCOTT, TRUSTS, § 12 (1939).
"McKey v. Paradise, 299 U.S. 119 (1936).
1206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953).
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filing a non-Communist affidavit in violation of the Taft-Hartley Law.2 As a result of
this testimony the witness was indicted and convicted of perjury Subsequent to her
conviction she was called as a witness in Valenti's trial 3 but refused to answer on the
grounds that her answers might tend to incriminate her. However, she had answered
identical questions, apparently without any objection, before the grand jury For her
refusal she was convicted of contempt. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction,
holding that a waiver of the privilege against self incrimination is limited to the partic-
ular proceeding in which the witness has volunteered testimony and that a trial and the
grand jury hearing upon which the trial is based do not constitute a single proceeding.
Certainly there can be little argument but that the privilege has become firmly
entrenched in American jurisprudence by constitutional provision, both Federal4 and
state. 5 Even in those states where no statutory authority for the privilege exists it is
given by judicial decision. 6 It extends to civil and criminal proceedings alike.7 In
order to take advantage of the privilege, the federal courts hold that the witness must
specifically claim it.8 He may do this whether at the trial or before a grand jury 9 But
the privilege may be waived either by contract or by voluntary testimony on the stand.'o
The problem presented by In re Neff then is: Once the privilege not to incrimnate
oneself has been waived by giving testimony, how far will such a waiver extend? The
vast majority of American courts that have been called upon to decide this question
have held that the waiver of the privilege is limited to the particular proceedings in
which the witness has thus volunteered testimony 11 Thus, the waiver has been held
not to extend to the main trial in cases where the witness has filed schedules preceding
a bankruptcy hearing,12 has testified in a preliminary examination in a criminal case, 13
or has made statements to a judge investigating election fraud.14 This limitation of the
waiver has been applied not only to the accused, but to general witnesses as well. 15
229 U.S.C.A. § 159(h) (1947)
'See United States v. Valenti, 207 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1953)
'U. S. CONST. AMEND. V.. "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. "
5see, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. Art. I, § 13, MAss. CONST. Art. 12 [§ 13], N. Y. CONST. Art. 1, § 6;
WAsH. CONST. Art. I, § 9.
'Duckworth v. District Court, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W 715 (1936)
'McCarthy v. Arndstem, 262 U.S. 355 (1922), af'd. 266 U.S. 34 (1924)
'Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1950), United States v. Momea, 317 U.S. 424 (1942),
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
9United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1942), Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)
"08 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2275 (3d ed. 1940)
"Arndstem v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920), United States v. Malone, 111 F.Supp. 37 (N.D.
Cal. 1953), Overend v. Superior Court, 131 CaL 280, 63 Pac. 372 (1900), Duckworth v. District
Court, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W 715 (1936), Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 514, 212 P.2d 425,
13 A.L.R.2d 1427 (1949), Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892 (1881)
"Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920)
"3Overend v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. 280, 63 Pac. 372 (1900), In re Mark, 146 Mich. 714,
110 N.W 61 (1906).
"4People v. Cassidy, 213 N.Y. 288, 107 N.E. 713 (1915)
"Overend v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. 280, 63 Pac. 372 (1900), Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379,
45 N.E. 728 (1896), Duckworth v. District Court, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W 715 (1936), In re Mark,
164 Mich. 714, 110 N.W 61 (1906), People v. Cassidy, 213 N.Y. 288, 107 N.E. 713 (1915)
But see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276(4) (3d ed. 1940) Professor Wigmore, though citing the
above cases for his authority, nevertheless seems to restrict the limitation of the waiver to the
accused only.
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In re Neff is the first case in which a federal court of appeals has applied this
rule to testimony given before a grand jury.1 6 The state courts, however, have long
acepted this rule.' 7 The reasoning of these courts is that since the waiver of the privi-
lege is confined to the one particular proceeding where it is made, and a grand jury
hearing and subsequent trial are not one proceeding, then it must follow that waiver
before a grand jury is not a waiver for the subsequent trial. Thus, in supporting their
conclusion the state courts must rely on the premise of the dissimilarity of a grand
jury and trial court.' 8 But this dissimilarity is also recognized by the federal courts' 9
with the justification for making such a distinction being aptly stated in the Neff case
itself. There Mars, C.J. said:
"The grand jury is not a judicial tribunal but rather an innormng or accusing body.
While an appendage of the court it does not conduct its proceedings judicially and when
after its secret ex parte investigation it finds and returns to the court an indictment against
a defendant its function with respect to that defendant is ended."' (Emphasis added.)
Thus, since both federal and state courts accept the proposition that the waiver of
the privilege against self incrimination is confined to the proceeding in which such
waiver is made, and since they both distinguish between a grand jury hearing and the
subsequent trial, the court in the Neff case was fully justified in reaching the same con-
clusions reached in the state cases upon which it relies.2 1 Is there a logical justification
for this conclusion? The problem posed by the question "the defendant having volun-
tarily testified before some official group, and having displayed a readiness to disclose
criminal acts, what end of justice will be furthered by allowing silence in the future?"1
2 2
is well worthy of consideration.
An interesting illustration of how the limitation of the waiver can frustrate prose-
cution 23 is provided by a California case, ex parte Sales.24 There, a witness had testi-
fied before a grand jury as to a particularly heinous murder committed by several
members of a secret society to which she belonged. Largely on the basis of this testi-
mony, several persons were indicted, but at their trial the witness invoked her privilege
against self incrimination and refused to testify.
An even stronger illustration of how a witness can take unfair advantage of the
limitations of the waiver is Duckworth v. District Court.25 In that case the witness who
"0However, just prior to the principal case, a federal district court applied the rule on similar
facts. United States v. Malone, 111 F.Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
"'Overend v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. 280, 63 Pac. 372 (1900) ; Ex parte Sales, 134 CaLApp.
54, 24 P.2d 916 (1933) ; Duckworth v. District Court, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 715 (1936) ; Apodaca
v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 514, 212 P.2d 425, 13 A.L.R.2d 1427 (1949).
"Banks v. State, 185 Ark. 539, 48 S.W.2d 847 (1932), Adams v. State, 214 Ind. 603, 17 N.E.2d
84, 118 A.L.R. 1095 (1938) ; Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 AtI. 45 (1933) ; State v. Lawler,
221 Wis. 423, 267 N.W. 65 (1936).
"SEx parte Barn, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) ; cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947) (by implication)
"Supra note 1 at 152.
2"Ex parte Sales, 134 Cal.App. 54, 24 P.2d 916 (1933) ; Duckworth v. District Court, 220 Iowa
1350, 264 N.W. 715 (1936) ; Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 514, 212 P.2d 425 (1949); Temple
v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892 (1881).
"Note, 8 So. CALIF. L. REv. 51, 52 (1934).
"3But pity not the poor prosecutor! The law still remains that a statement made voluntarily by
a witness under oath may be used against him in any subsequent prosecution or proceeding, unless
statute otherwise provides. Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1932); 58 AM. Jun.,
Witnesses, § 100, p. 82.
"'134 Cal.App. 54, 24 P.2d 916 (1933).
220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 715 (1936).
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